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The linkages among society and the environment generate normative challenges 
across at least three distinct dimensions.  First, environmental change imposes costs (both 
individual and collective) that fall disproportionately on various social groups, often 
those who have historically suffered from disadvantage and disenfranchisement.  Second, 
the necessity to create institutional arrangements for managing environmental change and 
integrating those decisions with collective choices in other areas poses value-laden 
questions of policy design.  Third, the human causes and consequences of environmental 
change and the collective choices they involve pit citizens and their understandings of the 
world against one another at the level of social action. 
The task confronting environmental governance analysts in responding to these 
challenges is to describe accurately and progressively develop the normative, political, 
and social consensus necessary for managing society-environment linkages in ways that 
are both ecologically sustainable and democratically legitimate.  The work of deliberative 
theory offers a coherent approach to this task when deliberative techniques are mapped 
onto these human dimensions of environmental change.  Deliberative democrats analyze 
the issues of distributional justice and social equity by using hypothetical case scenarios 
in juristic modeling exercises to describe existing elements of normative consensus 
regarding general legal principles.  They employ techniques of deliberative polling to 
measure support for alternative policy paradigms that institutionalize policy goals and 
objectives related to the society-environment linkage.  And deliberative democrats 
promote stakeholder partnerships that allow contending local discourses regarding the 
implementation of environmental policies to be reconciled through the coproduction of 
regulatory programs and procedures.   
 Although there is undoubtedly much to be said for the achievements associated 
with incompletely theorized agreements (Sunstein, 1999), a complete indifference to 
theorizing our successes ultimately leaves us less able to replicate them. It is in this 
respect that the efforts of governance and policy theorists can be most useful. What is 
needed most, perhaps, is a basic road map that will allow environmental actors to identify 
the techniques of deliberative democracy that best fit the challenges they face at each 
stage of the policy process--the formation of basic regulatory norms, the choice among 
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concrete plans of action.  Mapping and specifying these approaches to developing 
normative consensus for governance, as represented in the table below, is the objective of 
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Environmental Change and Governance: Normative Principles, Policy Models, 
Action Plans 
 Deliberative democratic practice has generally focused either on choices between 
competing policy models (like direct command and control regulation versus market-
based regulatory strategies) or on the development of local implementation agreements 
within the context of an existing regulatory scheme.  We have suggested elsewhere that a 
process of “juristic modeling” could be used to identify widely supported normative 
principles and general propositions of law through the adjudication by citizen juries of 
hypothetical cases involving disputes over environmental issues (Baber and Bartlett, 
2009). Particularly in the area of watershed governance, it is relatively easy to construct 
such hypothetical disputes. One can, for example, devise hypothetical scenarios that pit 
the doctrines of prior appropriation (according to which rights to water are established 
by a “first in time, first in right” rule) against claims of equitable utilization and state 
necessity (based upon a “public trust” doctrine under which resources like water are held 
in trust for general use).  This can be done across a wide range of factual circumstances 
without directly engaging the perceived interests of the citizens who participate in such 
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deliberations. 
 The point of departure for this approach is research conducted by Norman 
Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer (1992). Their empirical research in ethical theory 
involved a series of negotiations among small groups of individuals (normally five 
persons) who were asked to choose among four possible schemes of income distribution 
to be applied in a simulated economy. Their choice was then implemented in a series of 
simulations in which participants were asked to perform work for which they were paid 
and then their incomes were adjusted according to the policy they had previously 
adopted. 
 Juristic modeling, however, differs from the approach of Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer in several respects. Because participants are asked to choose among several 
regulatory norms rather than among redistributive policies, a more complex hypothetical 
situation is needed. Rather than a simple distribution of income, it is necessary to present 
participants with a more richly detailed set of circumstances involving the loss of an 
environmental good caused by one actor and imposed upon a different actor. The 
simulation is, if fact, a hypothetical legal case--complete with parties to be heard, 
pleadings to be weighed, and philosophical problems to be resolved. This approach was 
first suggested by the work of Kenneth Culp Davis (1969). The factual circumstances of 
the cases we have developed require participants to choose between hypothetical 
outcomes that represent some of the underlying normative principles of environmental 
protection and environmental change and governance. 
 Moreover, because it is more difficult to simulate regulatory actions than 
instances of income and taxation, it is necessary to create a survey instrument to capture 
the experiences of participants and relate them to deliberative outcomes. Instead of 
focusing on the reactions that participants have when they experience the consequences 
of their policy choices, juristic modeling concentrates on the deliberative process that 
produces those choices and the participants’ level of normative commitment to the 
principles eventually chosen.  We have developed a series of scenarios in which 
neighboring states lodge disputes against one another in a “court” over the use of a river 
that makes up their shared border. One of the disputes asks “jurors” whether the existing 
pattern of resource utilization (which significantly favors one state) should be respected 
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or whether that pattern should be altered to allow both states to exploit the river’s 
resources more equally (based on factors like their size and population). Early trials of 
this technique in Italy and the United States (US) indicate that participants shy away from 
standard legal doctrines, especially when confronted by the often troubling results of their 
strict interpretation. There is, however, a marked preference for “equitable use” outcomes 
over those associated with the traditional legal doctrine of prior appropriation. The level 
of consensus achieved in these early trials has been quite high, and it has shown 
considerable durability in the face of subsequent discussions about how the normative 
principles that had been agreed to could be concretized in policy models and, eventually, 
plans of administrative action. The advantage for environmental governance is clear. 
When resource utilization issues implicate basic normative questions (as the generally 
do), a preliminary deliberative experience with consensual norm building offers a 
foundation of mutuality that has the potential to expedite agreement at later stages of the 
policy process. This process of juristic modeling using hypothetical legal cases to identify 
basic normative principles is represented by the entries in the first row of the Table on 
page 2. 
 Deliberative democratic techniques are more commonly used at the next stage of 
the policy process--the choice among competing policy models. Within the deliberative 
democratic experience is a planning technique that seems generally well suited to 
selecting from among competing policy paradigms. This technique is usually referred to 
in the US as deliberative polling (Fishkin, 1995) and in Europe as the policy (or citizen) 
jury (Huitema, Kerkhof, and Pesch, 2007). It involves convening deliberative assemblies 
of from 100 to several hundred individuals who are presented with information regarding 
an existing public policy and the leading alternative approaches. These assemblies are 
then divided into “juries” of 12–15 persons, and each jury deliberates the choices it has 
been presented. In some cases, the jury is asked to come to the most inclusive consensus 
that it can. In other cases, no conclusion is asked of the jury. Rather, the participants are 
surveyed after their deliberations to determine their “considered opinion,” as opposed to 
their initial preferences. 
 In the context of watershed governance, a policy jury might be presented the 
choice between a piecemeal approach to the constituent problems of soil conservation, 
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species protection, and so forth, or a policy model that emphasizes the development of a 
comprehensive resource utilization plan encompassing within it the entire scope of the 
watershed. Or, perhaps, the choice might be between a series of command and control 
mechanisms of environmental protection and a collection of market-based strategies for 
resource conservation. As an example, biodiversity policy in the US has long been 
dominated by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which imposes strict (some would say 
draconian) restrictions on the taking of living beings once their species has been 
determined to be endangered. Another paradigm is the biodiversity policy of Italy, which 
emphasizes a comprehensive planning approach in which both the direct and the indirect 
effects of government decisions across a wide range of policy areas are to be evaluated 
for their impacts on plants and animals. As one might have guessed, the ESA has often 
been criticized for its narrow and belated focus on species that have become “terminally 
ill,” whereas the Italian approach has been faulted for not having sufficient enforcement 
capacity to actually protect anything. It should be equally unsurprising that a broader 
“bio-habitat” perspective has developed in the US and that Italy has taken steps to put 
more teeth in its biodiversity policy.  Our own deliberative experiments in both countries 
suggest that this convergence is due, at least in part, to the existence of an underlying 
consensus among Americans and Italians on the general contours of what an effective 
biodiversity policy requires. 
 Observers of deliberative democratic practice see both promise and peril in our 
collective experience with deliberative polling. One the one hand, policy juries have been 
lauded for offering us our best glimpse into the preferences of a more informed and 
engaged electorate--preferences that differ markedly from those expressed in 
conventional polls, in the voting booth, and in legislation engineered by self-interested 
lobbying groups (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2003). On the other hand, it has been argued 
that deliberating groups are prone to error as a consequence of group polarization 
(Sunstein, 2006). Even these critics, however, concede that their concerns apply largely 
to deliberative groups that are homogeneous and are deliberating questions susceptible of 
empirically verifiable answers. There is little to suggest that politically diverse policy 
juries are less able than elite decision makers to achieve ecologically rational results (as 
that phrase is being used here) and the advantages of such broadly democratic approaches 
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in terms of political rationality should be evident. Moreover, when methods of selection 
are used that provide demographically and ideologically heterogeneous deliberative 
groups, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the political consensus that 
emerges. A deliberative democratic approach is preferable to other approaches because it 
contains within itself the means of revising both its procedures and its products at the 
initiative of either organizers or participants (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). This 
process of deliberative polling at the stage of the choice between contending policy 
paradigms in order to identify basic policy objectives is represented in the second row of 
the Table on page 2. 
 Finally, deliberative democracy is already a familiar feature of watershed 
governance at the level of action plans and policy implementation in the form of 
watershed partnerships (Sabatier et al., 2005).  Sub-national stakeholder groups of this 
sort have already engaged the interests of deliberative democratic theorists (Baber and 
Bartlett, 2005). These structures of governance can best be understood as arrangements 
for organizing and reconciling competing local discourses about the implications of 
general legal requirements when applied to local questions. The objective is to develop 
implementation plans at the sub-national level that will achieve national (or international) 
objectives through the co-production of regulatory governance. One example of this 
approach has been described as “collaborative learning” (Cheng and Fiero, 2005). 
 Collaborative learning (CL), which is a recent innovation in public participation 
that departs from the traditional focus on issues and interests, is an approach designed 
specifically to address the complexity and rancorous conflict that often characterizes the 
governance of public lands. CL is characterized by a systems approach to understanding 
environmental change and governance issues, the promotion (instead of avoidance) of 
dialogue about differences among stakeholders, and a focus on feasible improvements in 
concrete circumstances rather than idea outcomes over the longer term. Unlike 
deliberative polling, which seeks stratified random samples of the population, CL 
employs landscape-based working groups that represent key stakeholder groups. An 
outstanding example of such groups is the watershed partnership (Clark, 1997). These 
voluntary groups convene at the local or regional level to discuss issues of watershed 
governance. Possessing no formal authority, watershed partnerships are open to anyone 
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wishing to participate.  But they generally attract large landowners and corporations 
whose behavior substantially affects watershed outcomes, environmentalists who can 
take up or forgo their right to sue under a variety of statutory schemes, and government 
officials who want to find safe ground in between. 
As perhaps the leading example of stakeholder partnerships, watershed 
partnerships are a well-understood and thoroughly documented technique for involving 
local participants in the management of a region’s natural resources.  But whether this is 
a widely deployable social technology is open to question.  First, stakeholder 
participation generally enjoys the advantage of small scale and relatively high levels of 
social and cultural homogeneity.  Under these circumstances, a shared sense of 
community plays a significant role in the success of issue-specific planning processes 
(Young, 2008).  These circumstances, however, are seldom present when the 
environmental challenge at hand is international in character.  Second, the adequacy of 
funding and institutional capacity which has been found to be critical to the success of 
stakeholder partnerships in the developed nations (Leach & Pelky, 2001) can rarely be 
counted upon to be available elsewhere in the world.  And while transfers of technology 
and resources are possible, they implicate another group of stakeholders, taking policy 
makers further from the relative simplicity of conventional watershed governance.  Third, 
there is a fear that low levels of literacy and political empowerment in the developing 
countries of the world will depress levels of stakeholder involvement, particularly among 
sub-groups of the population who are already neglected or exploited (Gupta, 2008).  
Fully participatory democracy, it is sometimes suggested, is a luxury that few countries 
can afford and few citizens even value.  How can each of these concerns be answered? 
International problems of environmental governance unquestionably place more 
complex demands on processes of collective action than do strictly local issues.  But 
international issues are even less amenable to command-and-control solutions than are 
problems arising in individual communities.  Watershed partnerships, like all cooperative 
decision processes, have distinct limitations.  Positive outcomes are always dependent 
upon existing stocks of human, social, and financial capital (Lubell, et al, 2002).  But 
watershed partnerships enjoy distinct advantages as a result of their ability to coalesce 
and operate in the absence of assertions of governmental authority.  These organizations 
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come in several varieties – government-centered, citizen-centered, and mixed-
membership.  Moreover, the secret to their success is not a sense of community per se.  It 
is, rather, that participants see themselves as members of a community of fate.  The 
pressing demands of their shared environmental challenge give them the motivation 
necessary to seek out collaborative solutions, regardless of whether they share social and 
cultural commonalities or are subject to the same legal mandates (Hardy and Koontz, 
2009).  It is the nature of the challenge that determines the character of the partnership. 
Resource adequacy is, in some ways, a more difficult challenge than the absence 
of social solidarity or state sovereignty.  It is an unhappy coincidence (and, perhaps, not 
so coincidental) that the most troubled regions of the world from an environmental 
perspective also face the most daunting economic challenges and possess the most 
limited institutional capabilities.  Sometimes regarded as the poster child for 
environmental lost causes, the Philippines is a case in point.  After decades of neglect, 
Philippine biodiversity is on the verge of collapse.  Ecosystems have been pushed beyond 
their limits, often with tragic consequences for human populations.  Philippine spending 
on environmental protection has been miniscule.  And when capacity building has been 
attempted, the economy rather than the ecology has been its focus.  In spite of this, recent 
research has suggested that signs of hope are beginning to emerge.  Locally based 
stakeholder partnerships, with the financial and technical support of international 
organizations, have made progress in water quality, forest conservation, and species 
protection.  Noticeable gains have also occurred in the production of science-based 
environmental publications and the building of institutional capacity for environmental 
governance in civil society (Posa, Diesmos, Sodhi, and Brooks, 2008). 
Finally, there is no reason to believe that literacy or political efficacy are 
prerequisites to participation in a stakeholder partnership for environmental governance.  
Construction workers in Panama have been enlisted by environmentalists in the effort to 
rescue animals threatened by expansion work in the canal zone.  Not only has their work 
been capable and reliable, they have begun to show an independent commitment to the 
effort (Correa, Carver, and Master, 2008).  The mangrove ecosystems of the North 
Brazilian coast have been converted from de facto open access areas that were subject to 
excessive exploitation into user-regulated and user-managed common pool resources 
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(Glaser and Oliveira, 2004).  And most promising of all, the management of Kenyan 
wildlife resources by stakeholder partnerships has been enabled by the creation of an 
innovative political framework, development of the capacity for self-organization within 
rural Kenyan communities, and the incentives created by the existence of group ranches 
within various wildlife dispersal areas (Mburu and Birner, 2007).  None of these features 
of Kenyan society are dependent in any direct or significant way upon the literacy or 
political influence of local residents.  
 Our experience with the role of watershed partnerships in developing governance 
action plans is particularly illuminating. It suggests that effective partnerships must be 
full partnerships. Regardless of the provenance of the watershed group (citizen based, 
agency based, or mixed), appropriate matching of partnership structure and operation to 
their roles is key (Moore and Koontz, 2003). This can be accomplished only by involving 
the local community in the underlying research that defines the policy problem at hand, 
because the watershed partnership fills the gap between what public institutions can 
achieve on their own and what the community itself needs (Arnold and Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2007; Shandas and Messer, 2008). But to achieve this level of autonomous 
input, community members of resource management partnerships need to be full partners. 
The regulatory environment within which they operate must be characterized by a low 
level of command and control enforcement by central authorities (Lubell et al., 2002), 
and they must enjoy the political clout and legal standing necessary to engage agency 
representatives as equals and to insist on the development of consensual (or nearly 
consensual) resolutions of regulatory problems (Cronin and Ostergren, 2007). It is this 
peculiarly social consensus that sustains the development, implementation, evaluation, 
and redesign of regulatory action plans during the numerous iterations through which 
they must pass. This process of using stakeholder partnerships to sort through contending 
discourse among local contributors to policy implementation is represented in the third 
row of the Table on page 2. 
 
Observations on Deliberative Practice 
 
 A number of observations are possible. First, there is nothing so unique about the 
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issues of environmental change and governance that it puts them out of the reach of 
democratic deliberation. New deliberative techniques like juristic modeling can easily be 
imagined as tools for exploring the contours and limitations of normative consensus 
about exploitation and conservation of natural resources. Well-tested techniques like 
deliberative polling can readily be used to elicit a more reflective public opinion on 
contending models of watershed governance.  Of course, watershed partnerships are the 
preeminent example of stakeholder planning and the co-production of regulatory 
implementation. Thus, at each successive step of the process of developing 
environmental governance and policy, deliberative techniques are readily deployable and 
offer significant advantages over less fully participatory approaches, particularly in terms 
of the political durability of the solutions that they produce. 
 The desirability of greater public participation in the formation of international 
environmental regimes has long been recognized.  The involvement of citizens in the 
development of environmental policy through domestic administrative rule making has 
been found to increase governmental accountability, improve the information base of 
public decision makers, and enhance the efficiency of the policy making process by 
revealing public sentiment at an earlier point than would otherwise be the case.  And the 
need to realize all of these advantages is just as great at the international level (Wirth, 
1996). 
 Citizen juries, in particular, offer some special advantages for environmental 
decision making.  As a complement to more traditional approaches to data gathering on 
public preferences, citizen juries allow for both the description of considered opinions 
and an assessment of the adequacy of the knowledge base underlying those opinions.  
This is particularly helpful in addressing the “citizen value” versus “consumer value” 
arguments that so often arise in this policy arena (Keynon, Hanley, and Nevin, 2001).  
Moreover, discourse-based techniques like citizen juries allow us to escape the paradox 
between the public nature of ecosystem values and their measurement through the 
isolated expression of individual preferences.  And because the allocation of 
environmental goods to one party affects the welfare of others, raising significant 
normative and ethical questions, discursive groups of this sort would seem to be an 
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especially appropriate forum for airing the issues of social equity that environmental 
decision making inevitably involves (Wilson and Howarth, 2002). 
 The story of citizen juries is not, however, one of unlimited promise.  Assembling 
adequately representative groups is always a challenge.  The role to be played by experts 
and government officials, and the accountability mechanisms associated with their 
participation, must also be considered (Kenyon, 2005).  More important still, there is an 
ever-present danger that deliberative discourse will degenerate into mere pluralistic 
bargaining.  Where some of our experiences with citizens’ juries suggests that they 
provide significant gains in citizen learning and have a positive effect on participants’ 
sense of political efficacy, there are also worrisome signs of recurring problems with 
group-think.   But an awareness of these tendencies on the part of those who construct 
these “minipublics” will allow for more consistent and reliable jury design (Huitema, 
Kerkhof, and Pesch, 2007). 
 The fact that democratic deliberation can be deployed at every stage of the 
process of environmental governance leads to a second observation--that deliberative 
democracy has the potential to add significantly to the political legitimacy of 
environmental governance. This is significant because environmental governance is 
likely to involve issues of distributive justice. This characteristic of environmental 
governance makes it difficult but essential to broaden involvement to include 
representatives of historically underrepresented groups. The experience of Native 
American tribes, for example, indicates that their political and economic disadvantages 
mean that they are not often involved in watershed partnerships.  Yet their involvement 
(when it occurs) leads public officials to deploy financial and human resources in ways 
that better manage watersheds across a full range of social values, resulting in more 
equitable and more defensible regulatory outcomes (Cronin and Ostergren, 2007). Thus, 
the realization that every step in the processes of environmental governance can include 
significant citizen participation means that a virtuous circle of public confidence and 
public involvement can be created that can legitimize outcomes that are ecologically 
sound but that may disappoint some stakeholders and might otherwise be rejected. 
 Finally, recognizing that democratic deliberation has a role to play at every stage 
of governance is just a short step from realizing that the linear assumption inherent in the 
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very concept of the policy process needs to be overcome. In any broadly participatory 
political process, arriving at consensus is a recursive proposition. Yesterday’s normative 
agreement can be unwound by today’s political dissent or tomorrow’s social discord. To 
a greater degree than theorists, perhaps, skilled policy analysts and experienced public 
managers are aware that all conclusions are tentative and no victory is final. That is why 
the leaders of collaborative watershed partnerships so often find themselves grappling 
with challenges of organization development and maintenance rather than the 
environmental issues that originally brought them to the table (Bonnell and Koontz, 
2007). Collaborative governance is at least as much a matter of organization building as it 
is environmental protection. A long recognized strength of deliberative democracy is its 
tendency to build social capital (Shandas and Messer, 2008). It does so in at least two 
ways.  
 First, well-implemented democratic deliberation makes it possible to achieve an 
“economy of moral disagreement.” Democratic deliberation requires citizens to justify 
their political positions to one another by seeking a rationale that is fully public, a 
rationale that all deliberators could (at least in principle) accept. This requirement 
minimizes the outright rejection by deliberators of positions that they oppose by 
discouraging reliance upon comprehensive moral or religious doctrines in favor of more 
limited rationale that allow for the eventual convergence of their views with those of 
others (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Second, democratic deliberation has the 
tendency to turn a collection of separate individuals into a self-identified group whose 
members see one another as cooperators in a shared project rather than as opponents in a 
zero-sum contest. Among the norms that deliberation promotes is a norm of cooperation 
within the group that is often strong enough to discourage members from clinging to their 
positions for transient or entirely personal reasons (Miller, 2003). This effect is so 
marked that our own use of juristic modeling has revealed a serious “repeat player” bias. 
When the same group of individuals is asked to resolve a series of hypothetical disputes, 
their ability to achieve consensus increases with every round of deliberation. For research 
purposes, this is a significant problem. But for the environmental practitioner it means 
that deliberative exercises conducted iteratively in any given community are likely to 
increase that community’s ability to resolve problems in a collaborative way.  Together 
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these two features of democratic deliberation (its tendency to reduce moral disputes and 
to promote consensus) can reduce the costs of organization maintenance in a stakeholder 
partnership by narrowing the grounds of disagreement among participants, thereby 
reducing the range of possible policy outcomes with which any final decision procedure 
must deal. When this result is achieved, more of the resources of environmental 
professionals can be turned to solving environmental problems as less time is spent 
overcoming the forces of organizational entropy. Ultimately, a tipping point is reached 
where gains in democratic legitimacy are no longer paid for with losses in organizational 
effectiveness. 
 An as yet unrecognized advantage of deliberative approaches to governance and 
policy formulation is that, when looked at collectively, they constitute a deliberative 
system that lends a greater degree of coherence to the often messy business of integrating 
citizen participation into the policy process.  When one examines the Table on page 2 
closely, one can discern the outlines of a governance cycle.  To begin, normative choice 
based upon the adjudication of hypotheticals requires (of course) that those hypotheticals 
be drafted.  The obvious choice of draftsman is the environmental governance 
professional.  But this need not be an exclusive step in the process.  Beyond the 
legitimating role played by disinterested citizens (as  final arbiters), representatives from 
both the development and conservation sides of the debate can be asked to provide such 
input as is required to insure that the hypothetical parties represent the arguments of 
actual stakeholders at their best.  In this context, consensus does not mean agreement 
about the ultimate results of an adjudication.  Rather, it is an agreement among interested 
parties representing a normative consensus that the hypothetical case to be presented is 
valid as a test of their competing philosophical positions. 
 The next deliberative step, the choice of policy juries among competing 
paradigms of regulatory policy requires a different sort of consensus.  What is required is 
an agreement among the various participants that the policy choices each is asked to 
advocate accurately represents their political goals and objectives.  Explanatory material 
provided to juries in support of each policy design must, by general agreement, be 
grounded in reliable  research and valid inference.  Certainly, administrative law judges 
possess the capacity to weigh the adversarial filings of “friends of the court” and 
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summarize those materials in ways that are adequate to the needs of citizen decision-
makers.  Judicial institutions have developed extensive bodies of legal doctrine regarding 
the admissibility of evidence and the appropriate instructions to be given to jurors.  This 
body of knowledge is readily available to any administrator who requires guidance on 
how to present competing policy paradigms in an even-handed manner to citizen juries 
that can support a political consensus that extends only to the structure of the  decision 
choice that is to be presented. 
 Third, the policy approach ultimately adopted will require the development of 
implementation plans that are specific to each region and jurisdiction where the problem 
underlying the policy arises.  For instance, watershed governance may be undertaken 
within the context of a state or national policy mandate, but its implementation is an 
outstanding example of the aphorism that policy is procedure.  Watershed partnerships in 
the United States and elsewhere have shown a marked capacity for translating broad 
policy mandates into environmental governance plans that are durable and workable 
because they are local and consensual.  Deliberative democracy, at this level, does not 
pretend to impartiality or require it of participants.  Involvement in the planning process 
is voluntary and open to all.  The resulting action plan is intended to capture, not an ideal 
outcome, but a social consensus about what compromises and accommodations will be 
required for those involved to move forward in a fashion that is sufficiently cooperative 
that the convening authority will not withdraw its support of the partnership. 
 An additional advantage to viewing deliberative democratic techniques as 
elements in a governance cycle is that it allows us to address problems of democratic 
legitimacy.  This is particularly true in the area of international law and policy.   
Habermas (1996) argues that democratic legitimacy results when behavioral rules have 
the qualities of normativity and facticity.  By this it is meant that a rule can be regarded 
by those to whom it addressed as both morally justified and practically effective, in other 
words, as both a social norm and a social fact.  International rules suffer, therefore, both 
from their lack of any genuinely democratic provenance and from their frequent failure to 
be fully developed and executed.  A deliberative governance cycle offers solutions at 
each of these levels. 
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 Transnational deliberations that allow representative samples of the global public 
to resolve concrete (but hypothetical) disputes over important ecological values would 
provide an opportunity to discover areas of normative agreement about basic principles of 
environmental protection and the use of natural resources.  Where normative consensus is 
lacking, such deliberations would allow for the more accurate “mapping” of citizens’ 
considered opinions – resulting in an “economy of moral disagreement” (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004), which would reduce international tensions and promote cooperation in 
areas where cooperation is actually possible. 
 At the level of the development of paradigms of regulatory policy, deliberative 
polling of representative citizen groups at the national level would allow for the 
democratic legitimation of choices among the available alternative approaches to 
environmental protection and governance.  If the alternatives presented are each plausible 
manifestations of a normative consensus identified earlier in the transnational governance 
cycle, the resulting choices might be expected to constitute a form of common but 
differentiated responsibility that would enjoy greater political viability because it 
possessed greater democratic legitimacy.  James Fishkin’s recent success in conducting 
deliberative polling in the People’s Republic of China shows that these techniques do not 
require high levels of education, economic development, or previous democratic 
experience. 
 Finally, at the level of policy execution, the use of stakeholder partnerships to 
develop implementation plans holds promise for transnational governance.  These 
decentralized approaches to environmental protection and governance have been 
particularly useful in circumstances where national governments either lacked the 
capacity to impose national solutions or were reluctant to do so for political reasons.  The 
implication for international law and policy are clear.  Where enforcement options are of 
limited utility or are entirely lacking, voluntary compliance can only be enhanced when 
those whose conduct is to be regulated are centrally involved in defining what 
compliance actually amounts to in practice. 
 So when viewed in a systematic perspective, the model of deliberative policy 
development presented here presents a coherent picture of a participatory planning cycle 
that provides a significant level of citizen involvement at each stage of the governance 
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process.  It legitimates and rationalizes the involvement of interest groups and other 
nongovernmental organizations in the policy formulation.  And it lends concreteness and 
plausibility to the idea of consensus as something more than a political ideal. 
 
Is Deliberation Worth the Cost? 
 
 Each of the aforementioned deliberative practices imposes costs, both in terms of 
financial and personnel resources and in terms of the political risks attendant to broader 
public participation in environmental governance. Why should professional managers, 
already short on resources and long on controversy, spend either organizational or 
political capital on these efforts? Three major justifications suggest themselves. 
 First, environmental regimes must meet the standard of ecological rationality if 
they are to be effective in practice. Though not especially bold, this is an important 
assertion because it carries with it a certain amount of freight. One could describe many 
forms of rationality (Bartlett, 1987). Some of these forms of rationality are at least partly 
incompatible. In some instances, they may even conflict in fundamental ways. Moreover, 
they are not all of the same order of importance. But two of them are critical to this 
argument--political rationality and ecological rationality. 
 Diesing (1962) argues that political rationality takes precedence over other forms 
because the solution of problems of governance makes possible an attack on other 
problems within which concerns over other forms of rationality arise. A serious 
deficiency in political rationality can, therefore, undermine our ability to pursue, much 
less achieve, any other form of rationality.  But Dryzek (1987) views ecological 
rationality as fundamental. The failure to preserve and promote the integrity of the 
environmental and the material underpinning of society would render ineffectual, even 
irrelevant, our efforts to achieve other forms of rationality. Bearing in mind that Diesing 
did not explicitly consider the status of ecological rationality, it is a small step from 
Dryzek’s argument to ours—that ecological rationality is a Janus-faced concept. It 
subsumes the concepts of both environmental sustainability and political sustainability, 
viewing each as an essential element in the long-term protection of humanity’s ecological 
resources and as an essential prerequisite to the pursuit of other forms of rationality 
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(Baber and Bartlett, 2005). 
 A second justification for democratic deliberation is that its elitist- and interest-
group-driven alternatives are inadequate. To satisfy ecological rationality’s need for 
political sustainability, a more robust form of democracy than contemporary interest-
group liberalism is required. Although it may be true that reports of liberalism’s death 
have been greatly exaggerated, that the patient is suffering an illness is generally not 
disputed. The diagnosis that liberalism is inherently incompatible with environmental 
protection because it takes human interests as the measure of all values (Matthews, 1991) 
does not have to be entirely correct for us to recognize that some new form of democracy 
may be called for. We need only acknowledge that there are real tensions between 
preservation and conservation--between protection and wise use--and that the 
consequences of ignoring those tensions are potentially serious.  
 It is our argument, however, that both elite meritocracy and interest-group 
oligopoly fail the test of ecological rationality. A meritocracy of science-based elites will 
ultimately fail to translate its understanding of environmental problems into effective 
environmental policy. Simply as a practical matter, the dynamics of the policy process 
require experts to express themselves in ordinary language, to adopt the lay perspective 
when engaged in collective decision making, and to offer reasons for the positions they 
take in the public arena that are fully accessible to the other actors that they encounter 
there and hope to influence (Baber and Bartlett, 2007). To overcome this problem 
without surrendering their claim to special authority, a meritocracy would have to sell 
itself to (or actually become) the alternative that Ophuls (1997) has posed it against--an 
interest-group oligopoly. But that form of governance will also fail to achieve ecological 
rationality because it is a form of government that is politically unsustainable in modern 
societies and because it cannot produce the broadly held ecological consensus that 
successful environmental governance requires. Problems of environmental governance 
generally are so thoroughly interpenetrated with questions of individual choice that new 
moral, conceptual, and affective frameworks must be developed (Valadez, 2001). What is 
required is a mutualistic and cooperative view of nature to which human social, 
economic, and political life can be reconciled. That result can be achieved only through 
the creation of institutions of governance that are more (not less) democratic than the 
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existing practices of interest-group liberalism (Baber, 2004). 
 Finally, democratic deliberation is justified by a number of developments, often 
discussed under the general heading of globalization, that are impeding the ability of 
national governments and their subunits to address problems of environmental 
governance associated with resource regimes and environmental regimes alike. A range 
of increasingly powerful agents, including nongovernmental organizations, transnational 
advocacy networks, communities of scientific expertise, and social movements of global 
reach are challenging the conventional sovereign state for control of the environmental 
agenda. The resulting tensions are clearly visible in the transnationalization of 
governance as it increasingly becomes the subject of international environmental regimes 
(Conca, 2005). Problems of soil conservation, water management, and the preservation of 
species diversity that challenge national and sub-national governmental institutions are 
merely localized manifestations of the loss of vital ecosystem services at a global scale 
(Galaz et al., 2008). These challenges manifest themselves at both the sub-national and 
supranational levels of governance, calling into question basic principles of 
environmental protection, contending models of environmental regulation, and competing 
plans of environmental action. 
 Deliberative democratic processes have immense potential to inform and 
legitimate environmental governance at each of these levels in ways that respond to the 
challenges of ecological rationality, popular participation, and globalization (Baber and 
Bartlett, 2005, 2009).  Here we extend the reach of that analysis, placing techniques of 
democratic deliberation at the disposal of those whose duty it is to regulate the human 
dimensions of global environmental change. But if environmentalism is to find its “third 
way,” if it is to develop a common language in which to construct environmental regimes 
possessed of a genuinely democratic provenance, that breakthrough is most likely to be 
found at the level of practice--in the iterative innovations in problem solving developed 
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